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DOES A COMMUTER’S CHOICE OF WHERE TO RESIDE
IMPLICATE THE DORMANT COMMERCE CLAUSE?
ROBERT J. FIRESTONE*
Until relatively recently,1 there was little doubt that nonresi-
dent commuters must look to the Privileges and Immunities Clause
of the United States Constitution for protection against discrimina-
tory state taxes.2  A personal income tax levied on the income of
individuals who commute to work from their personal residences
located outside of the state should not implicate the “dormant”
commerce clause, a restraint on state authority that has been im-
plied from the Commerce Clause,3 and which protects interstate
business operations and transactions.4
Although the Commerce Clause gives Congress broad author-
ity to regulate any activity that exerts an influence on interstate
* Adjunct Professor of Law and faculty advisor to Tax LL.M. Program, New York
Law School.  Professor Firestone is a Senior Counsel at the New York City Law Depart-
ment, where he supervises tax litigation and reviews tax legislation.  The article reflects
the personal views of the author.
1. In City of New York v. State, 94 N.Y.2d 577, 596, 598 (2000), New York’s highest
court invalidated the City of New York’s discriminatory commuter tax under the Privi-
lege and Immunities and Commerce Clauses.
2. See, e.g., Austin v. New Hampshire, 420 U.S. 656, 667 (1975); Travis v. Yale &
Towne Mfg. Co., 252 U.S. 60, 80 (1920) (invalidating discriminatory commuter taxes
under the Privileges and Immunities Clause).
3. See Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 53 U.S. 299, 319 (1851) (stating that the states
may regulate commerce through their police powers only insofar as the effect on inter-
state commerce is sufficiently local in nature so as not to require a uniform national
rule). See also Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 623 (1978) (“The bounds of
these [dormant commerce clause] restraints appear nowhere in the words of the Com-
merce Clause, but have emerged gradually in the decisions of this Court giving effect to
its basic purpose.”).
4. In Camps Newfound/Owatonna v. Town of Harrison, 520 U.S. 564, 581 (1997),
the Court stated that “[a] State may not tax a transaction or incident more heavily when
it crosses state lines than when it occurs entirely within the State.” See id. at 580-81
(invalidating, under the Commerce Clause, a discriminatory real property tax exemp-
tion because it “functionally serves as an export tariff that targets out-of-state consumers
by taxing the businesses that principally serve them.”). See Armco, Inc.  v. Hardesty, 467
U.S. 638, 642 (1984) (invalidating manufacturing tax exemption which discriminated
against out-of-state manufacturers).
943
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commerce,5 the dormant commerce clause serves but one limited
function: It “prohibits economic protectionism — that is, regula-
tory measures designed to benefit in-state economic interests by
burdening out-of-state competitors . . . .”6  Not every activity that
Congress is capable of regulating pursuant to its Commerce Clause
authority implicates the dormant commerce clause.  Otherwise, the
dormant commerce clause would swallow the express provision
from which it was implied, in effect, relegating Congress’s authority
to regulate interstate commerce to the courts.  The dormant com-
merce clause is, thus, implicated only where a state tax or regula-
tory measure discriminates against interstate business, or where a
state tax or regulatory measure overreaches such that it has the po-
tential of exerting excessive multiple burdens on interstate
business.7
The United States Supreme Court has never wavered from this
interpretation of the scope and application of the dormant com-
merce clause in more than 150 years of its decisions; a notable con-
sistency, given that during the same period the Court had otherwise
turned the dormant commerce clause practically on its head.8 Nev-
ertheless, the expanded meaning the Court has given to “interstate
commerce,” where Congress exercises its affirmative grant of au-
thority under the so-called “positive” Commerce Clause,9 has raised
the question of whether the dormant commerce clause now com-
pletely eclipses a whole range of activities previously thought to be
5. See, e.g., Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942) (personal consumption of
homegrown wheat is interstate commerce); Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379
U.S. 241 (1964) (operation of local motel is interstate commerce); Katzenbach v. Mc-
Clung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964) (operation of local restaurant is interstate commerce).
6. West Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186, 192 (1994) (non-discrimina-
tory tax levied on all local sellers of milk, coupled with a rebate of the tax only to local
milk producers, was held to be a discriminatory import tariff).
7. See infra text accompanying notes 39-62.
8. The Court itself has referred to its earlier Commerce Clause jurisprudence as
a “quagmire” and lamented that it had “handed down some three hundred full-dress
opinions [interpreting the Commerce Clause which] . . . leaves much room for contro-
versy and confusion and little in the way of precise guides to the States in the exercise of
its indispensable power of taxation.”  Northwestern States Portland Cement Co. v. Min-
nesota, 358 U.S. 450, 457-58 (1959).
9. See generally Wickard, 317 U.S. at 111; Heart of Atlanta Motel, 379 U.S. at 241;
Katzenbach, 379 U.S. at 294.
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within the exclusive domain of the Privileges and Immunities
Clause.10
The Court had previously construed “interstate commerce”
more narrowly under the dormant commerce clause to avoid strik-
ing down state taxes.11  In dispensing with this double standard,12
the Court has recently remarked that there is but one definition of
interstate commerce, regardless of whether Congress seeks to regu-
late it pursuant to its affirmative grant of authority, or strike down a
measure as violating the dormant commerce clause.13  The Court’s
statement must be placed in its appropriate context, however, and
should not be taken to suggest that the Court now views the dor-
mant commerce clause as reaching every area within Congress’s do-
main.  Insofar as commuting impacts interstate commerce,
Congress can regulate the taxation of individual commuters pursu-
ant to its affirmative Commerce Clause authority.  Where Congress
is silent, however, the dormant commerce clause operates only to
protect interstate business transactions and business operations
from discriminatory burdens, i.e., “[t]he dormant [c]ommerce
[c]lause protects markets and participants in markets, not taxpayers
as such.”14  It is, thus, limited to tariff-like measures that burden
competition in interstate markets.15
10. See generally City of New York, 94 N.Y.2d at 577.
11. See Commonwealth Edison v. Montana, 453 U.S. 609, 617 (1981), in which the
Court formally “disapproved” of its earlier narrow definition of interstate commerce for
purposes of the dormant commerce clause described in Heisler v. Thomas Colliery Com-
pany, 260 U.S. 245 (1922).  Under that earlier view, which nominally proclaimed that
any tax levied on interstate commerce violated the dormant commerce clause, inter-
state commerce was defined narrowly so as to permit states to tax the so-called local
incidents of interstate commerce. Id. at 260-61.  A tax would, thus, not implicate the
dormant commerce clause where it was imposed on goods prior to their entry into
interstate commerce, or after the goods came to rest in the state.  The Court formally
rejected this formalistic approach in favor of a “practical” economic analysis of the tax
or regulation to ascertain its true effects.  Commonwealth Edison, 453 U.S. at 617, 625.
12. The Court first acknowledged the double standard it had been applying in
Katzenbach, 379 U.S. at 302. Cf. Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385, 394, 406 (1948).
13. See Camps Newfound, 520 U.S. at 574 (“The definition of ‘commerce’ is the
same when relied on to strike down or restrict state legislation as when relied on to
support some exertion of federal control or regulation . . . [I]n Philadelphia v. New Jersey,
437 U.S. 617 (1978) . . . we rejected a ‘two-tiered definition of commerce.’”).
14. General Motors Corp. v. Tracy, 519 U.S. 278, 300 (1997).
15. See, e.g., Camps Newfound, 520 U.S. at 580-81 (holding that a property tax credit
which discriminated against camps marketing their services to out-of-state consumers,
“functionally serves as an export tariff that targets out-of-state consumers by taxing the
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Due to the narrow definition the Court had given “interstate
commerce”16 in the field of state taxation17 prior to its landmark
decision in Complete Auto Transit v. Brady,18 the Court has not, as of
yet, had the occasion to consider whether personal commuting im-
plicates the dormant commerce clause.  It is, nevertheless, the pur-
pose of this article to show that, while the scope of the dormant
commerce clause has been justifiably expanded in the post-Complete
Auto era, so as to replace antiquated notions of when interstate
commerce begins and ends with a practical economic analysis, the
Court has exercised due care when redefining the reach of the dor-
mant commerce clause to avoid engulfing other constitutional pro-
visions within its path.  Therefore, under a straightforward reading
of the Court’s Commerce Clause jurisprudence, and basic princi-
ples of construction applicable no less to the Constitution, personal
commuting remains within the exclusive domain of the Privileges
and Immunities Clause unless Congress provides otherwise.  The
Privileges and Immunities Clause has not been effectively eclipsed
by the dormant commerce clause.
businesses that principally serves them.”). See also West Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy,
512 U.S. 186, 193 (1994) (describing tariffs as “[t]he paradigmatic example of a law
discriminating against interstate commerce.”).
16. See, e.g., Toomer, 334 U.S. at 394-95 (holding that a discriminatory state tax on
nonresidents for catching shrimp in state waters did not violate the Commerce Clause
because “the taxable event, the taking of shrimp, occurs before the shrimp can be said
to have entered the flow of interstate commerce.”). See also Heisler, 260 U.S. at 261
(holding that states may tax local incidents of interstate commerce — namely, coal,
which was “plainly not . . . moving” and which was “too definitely situated to be
misunderstood.”).
17. The Court had construed the state’s power to tax interstate commerce, as lim-
ited by the dormant commerce clause, more narrowly than when Congress exercised its
affirmative grant of authority to regulate commerce. See Katzenbach, 379 U.S. at 302
(“Nor are the cases holding that interstate commerce ends when goods come to rest in
the state of destination apposite here.  That line of cases has been applied with refer-
ence to state taxation or regulation but not in the field of federal regulation.”).
18. 430 U.S. 274, 279 (1977) (applying a practical economic analysis to the dor-
mant commerce clause, under the assumption that a state sales tax on local transporta-
tion originating and terminating within the state could, nevertheless, burden the sale of
goods delivered into the state by an out-of-state manufacturer if imposed at a discrimi-
natory rate or if unfairly apportioned to the in-state taxable activity). See Commonwealth
Edison, 453 U.S. at 617 (specifically rejecting the narrow definition of “commerce” that
preceded Complete Auto).
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I. HARMONIZING THE SCOPE OF THE DORMANT COMMERCE CLAUSE
AND THE PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES CLAUSE
The principal motivation for replacing the Articles of Confed-
eration with the Constitution was to curtail the authority of individ-
ual states to enact protectionist legislation that erected barriers to
interstate trade.19  The Articles of Confederation did provide inter-
state commerce with a degree of limited protection against discrim-
ination in the form of a Privileges and Immunities Clause that “was
carried over into the comity article of the Constitution in briefer
form, but with no change in substance or intent . . .”20
The Privileges and Immunities Clause in Article IV of the Con-
stitution provides that “[t]he Citizens of each State shall be entitled
to all Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the several States.”21
Since the scope of the Privileges and Immunities Clause extends
only to “Citizens” of other states, the Clause provides only limited
protection to interstate commerce for two fundamental reasons.
First and foremost, the Clause, by its plain language, provides inter-
state business with inadequate protection from state statutes aimed
specifically at interstate business transactions or interstate business
operations without regard to residency.22  Second, the Court has
held that a corporation is not a “Citizen” within the meaning of the
Clause.23  Since corporations have been the principal instrumental-
ity for conducting interstate commerce, this second limitation
removes most of the remaining usefulness of the Clause in restrict-
ing state laws aimed at burdening interstate commerce transacted
by nonresidents.  It protects only nonresident individuals from state
laws intended to disadvantage them against local residents, leaving
19. RICHARD D. POMP & OLIVER OLDMAN, STATE AND LOCAL TAXATION 1 (4th ed.
2001).
20. Austin v. New Hampshire, 420 U.S. 656, 661 (1975).  Charles Pinkney, who
drafted the Privileges and Immunities Clause, stated at the Constitutional Convention
that it was “formed exactly upon the principles of the 4th article of the present Confed-
eration” [its predecessor in the Articles of Confederation]. Id. See also Saenz v. Roe,
526 U.S. 489, 501 (1999); United States v. Wheeler, 254 U.S. 281, 294 (1920).
21. U.S. CONST. art. IV, §2.
22. See Austin, 420 U.S. at 663 n.8 (noting that “[f]or purposes of analyzing a tax-
ing scheme under the Privileges and Immunities Clause the terms ‘citizen’ and ‘resi-
dent’ are essentially interchangeable.”).
23. Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. 168, 177 (1869).
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a huge opening for states to enact laws that burden interstate
business.
To fill this void, the Commerce Clause provides a broad express
grant of authority to Congress to address any and all aspects of this
problem in the manner it sees fit.  It provides that “[t]he Congress
shall have Power . . . To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations,
and among the several States.”24  Congress has plenary power to
regulate interstate commerce pursuant to this express grant of au-
thority.25 Its power to act pursuant to this affirmative grant of au-
thority is occasionally referred to as the “positive” Commerce
Clause,26 to differentiate it from the so-called “negative” or “dor-
mant” commerce clause that, by its own force, restricts the states
from taxing or regulating activities so as to exert an unjustifiably
greater burden on interstate commerce than on intrastate
commerce.27
When considering the degree of interplay between the dor-
mant commerce clause and the Privileges and Immunities Clause, it
is essential to note that the Court has given effect to the dormant
commerce clause in spite of its not having been made explicit in
the Constitution.28  Rather, the dormant commerce clause is a nec-
24. U.S. CONST. art. 1, §8, cl. 3.
25. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1 at 193, 196 (1824) (holding that Congress’s
power to regulate commerce “is complete in itself, may be exercised to its utmost ex-
tent, and acknowledges no limitations, other than are prescribed in the constitution.”).
See also Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona ex rel. Sullivan, 325 U.S. 761, 769 (1945) (“Con-
gress has undoubted power to redefine the distribution of power over interstate com-
merce.  It may either permit the states to regulate the commerce in a manner which
would otherwise not be permissible, or exclude state regulation even of matters of pecu-
liarly local concern which nevertheless affect interstate commerce.”) (citations
omitted).
26. See, e.g., West Lynn Creamery, 512 U.S. at 193 n.9; Arizona v. Atchison, Topeka &
Santa Fe Railroad Co. 656 F.2d 398, 406-07 (9th Cir. 1981).
27. Oregon Waste Sys., Inc. v. Dep’t of Envtl. Quality, 511 U.S. 93, 98-99 (1994).
See, e.g., Oklahoma Tax Comm’n v. Jefferson Lines, Inc., 514 U.S. 175, 185 (1995)
(holding that in the area of taxation, the Commerce Clause requires that a state taxing
scheme be “internally consistent” to assure equal treatment between interstate and in-
trastate commerce.) See Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970) (holding
that in the regulatory context, equality is achieved by balancing the local regulatory
interest against the burden the regulation places on interstate commerce.).
28. See, e.g., H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525, 534-35 (1949)
(“While the Constitution vests in Congress the power to regulate commerce among the
states, it does not say what the states may or may not do in the absence of congressional
action, nor how to draw the line between what is and what is not commerce among the
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essary implication of the delicate balance the Commerce Clause
seeks to strike between (1) the Constitution’s broad grant of power
to Congress to regulate the national economy, and (2) the reten-
tion by the states of their police and taxing powers, even where the
exercise of those powers impact interstate commerce, so long as the
states do not overreach by interfering with the free flow of inter-
state trade.29  Therefore, unlike the positive Commerce Clause and
the Privileges and Immunities Clause, both of which are explicit in
the Constitution, the dormant commerce clause is not, but is im-
plied from the text of the Constitution when read against the back-
drop of the federal-state structure that was its central concern.
While the Commerce Clause was the centerpiece of a Constitu-
tion principally concerned with the free flow of interstate trade, a
core concern of the Privileges and Immunities Clause, which pre-
dated the Constitution and was carried over from the Articles of
Confederation, was to place nonresidents on a substantially equal
footing with residents of the state30 “in the pursuit of common callings
states. Perhaps even more than by interpretation of its written word, this Court has advanced the
solidarity and prosperity of this Nation by the meaning it has given to these great silences of the
Constitution.”) (emphasis added). Id.
29. See Cooley, 53 U.S. at 299.  The origin of the dormant commerce clause is trace-
able to Chief Justice Marshall’s opinion in Gibbons.  Justice Marshall construed the lan-
guage “among the several States” as giving Congress the authority to regulate “that
commerce which concerns more States than one.”  22 U.S. at 194.  He interpreted this
language as giving Congress broad authority to regulate intrastate commerce as well,
except as to “those internal concerns . . . which do not affect other States.” Id. at 195.
Gibbons, thus, interpreted the Commerce Clause as having removed this power from the
states, delegating it exclusively to Congress. Id. at 199-200.  Each state, however, re-
tained, under the Tenth Amendment, the power “to regulate its police, its domestic
trade, and to govern its own citizens” even where the exercise of those powers affects
interstate commerce. Id. at 208.  The Court has, thus, implied the dormant commerce
clause from the allocation of power under the Constitution between the Congress and
the states.  Even where Congress does not act, the Commerce Clause operates by its own
force to prevent the states from regulating interstate commerce as such, and allows the
states to regulate commerce only as an incident of their local police powers, and then
only to the extent that the state has a legitimate interest in the subject matter, pursuant
to its police powers, that justifies the burden it places on interstate commerce. See, e.g.,
Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511, 521 (1935) (holding that a New York regu-
lation fixing the price of milk imported from other states was not a legitimate exercise
of New York’s police powers and that “New York has no power to project its legislation
into Vermont by regulating the price to be paid in that state for milk acquired there.”).
30. Saenz, 526 U.S. at 502 (holding that nonresidents may be treated differently
than residents if there is a “substantial” reason for the difference in treatment); Toomer
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within the state, in the ownership and disposition of privately held
property within the state, and in access to the courts of the state.”31
One of the basic protections, thus, afforded nonresidents by the
Privileges and Immunities Clause was the right “to ply their trade,
practice their occupation, or pursue a common calling within the
State,” free from unjustified discrimination.32  It is, therefore, in the
federal-state balance struck by the Privileges and Immunities Clause
that “a resident of one State is constitutionally entitled to travel to
another State for purposes of employment free from discriminatory
restrictions in favor of state residents imposed by the other State.”33
Once again, the federal-state structure contemplated by the Privi-
leges and Immunities Clause is one of “substantial equality.” By way
of comparison, the dormant commerce clause imposes a stricter
standard, generally foreclosing any justifiable basis for discrimina-
tion against interstate business transactions or operations.34  Thus,
while the “substantial equality” standard of review under the Privi-
leges and Immunities Clause is one of heightened scrutiny, a tax or
regulation found to discriminate against interstate commerce
would rarely, if ever, withstand the strict scrutiny standard under the
dormant commerce clause.35
Since the protection of individuals who commute to another
state to seek employment is one of the more basic rights protected
by the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV, settled rules
of construction dictate that the dormant commerce clause cannot
v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385 (1948) (nonresidents of state entitled to be treated on terms of
“substantial equality” with residents).
31. Baldwin v. Montana, 436 U.S. 371, 383 (1978) (emphasis added) (citations
omitted).
32. Hicklin v. Orbeck, 437 U.S. 518, 524-25 (1978).
33. Id. at 525.
34. Although the Privileges and Immunities Clause tolerates some discrimination,
so long as it meets the Court’s parameters for heightened scrutiny, the dormant com-
merce clause generally tolerates no discrimination whatsoever, no matter how justified
and no matter how small. See Camps Newfound, 520 U.S. at 582 (quoting Chemical Waste
Mgmt. Inc. v. Hunt, 504 U.S. 334, 342 (1992)) (“Once a state tax is found to discrimi-
nate against out-of-state commerce, it is typically struck down without further inquiry.”).
See also Associated Indus. v. Lohman, 511 U.S. 641, 649-50 (1994) (“Under our cases,
unless one of several narrow bases of justification is shown, actual discrimination, wher-
ever it is found, is impermissible, and the magnitude and scope of the discrimination
have no bearing on the determinative question whether the discrimination has
occurred.”).
35. Associated Indus., 511 U.S. at 652.
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impose a greater restriction on state authority over this identical
area of personal commuting, because implied language cannot
override express language in the same legal instrument.36  More
fundamentally, if the “pursuit of common callings” within a state
was one of the core “privileges and immunities” that carried over
into Article IV of the Constitution, then that entire subject should
not be deemed to have been removed to the dormant commerce
clause, because implied repeals are strongly disfavored.37  Under
another closely related canon of construction, the meaning attrib-
uted to the specific term “privileges and immunities,” should not be
diminished by the more general, implied, language of the dormant
commerce clause.38
The Court has maintained the delicate balance between a
state’s authority to exercise its sovereign police powers and Con-
gress’s authority to regulate trade by confining the applicability of
the dormant commerce clause to two circumstances: (1) taxes or
regulations which exceed the state’s interest in the subject of inter-
state commerce being taxed or regulated,39 and (2) taxes or regula-
tions which discriminate against interstate commerce.40
The taxation of individuals who commute across state lines for
personal reasons fits within neither of these two circumstances.  In-
asmuch as the employee’s place of business is not situated at his or
her home, but at the employer’s office located within the taxing
state,41 that state may properly apportion and, thus, tax 100% of the
36. United States v. Stanley Ferryman, 897 F.2d 584, 589 (6th Cir. 1990) (“the
usual canons of construction also require that we prefer the specific over the general,
what is express over what might be implied.”).
37. Baldwin, 436 U.S. at 383; see also Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 550-51
(1974) (holding that no implied repeal unless two provisions in apparent conflict are
“irreconcilable.”).
38. Morton, 417 U.S. at 550-51.  Radzanower v. Touche Ross & Co., 426 U.S. 148,
154 (1976) (since the Commerce Clause and the Privileges and Immunities Clause were
simultaneously adopted in the Constitution, and the two clauses are not completely co-
extensive with each other, the rule that where a “later act covers the whole subject of
the earlier one and is clearly intended as a substitute, it will operate similarly as a repeal
of the earlier act” has no application).
39. Pike, 397 U.S. at 142; Complete Auto, 430 U.S. at 279.
40. See, e.g., Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 138 (1986); Complete Auto, 430 U.S. at
279.
41. See Zelinsky v. Tax Appeals Tribunal of New York, 1 N.Y.3d 85, 92–5 (2003),
cert. denied, 124 S. Ct. 2068 (2004) (upholding New York’s “convenience of the em-
ployer” rule and holding that the dormant commerce clause does not grant to a law
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employee’s wage income without implicating the dormant com-
merce clause.42  The activity the state seeks to tax — employment
— takes place entirely at the employer’s place of business within
the taxing state, thus, furnishing “the economic justification for the
State’s claim upon the [entire] value taxed.”43  It follows that since
100% of a commuter’s business activity takes place within the taxing
jurisdiction, and no part of it takes place at the commuter’s per-
sonal residence, there is no interstate business activity that would
implicate the dormant commerce clause.44  Any differential treat-
ment of commuters as compared with local residents would, thus,
be on the basis of residency, not interstate business activity, and
would violate the Privileges and Immunities Clause unless there is a
“substantial justification” for the differential treatment.
The aforementioned limitation on the dormant commerce
clause as protecting only interstate business, rather than the choice
of a personal residence, becomes more apparent in relation to cor-
porations.  State license fees imposed for the privilege of doing bus-
iness are generally deemed to discriminate against interstate
commerce and, thus, violate the dormant commerce clause where
they discriminate against foreign corporations by reason of their
place of domicile.45  In Kraft General Foods, Inc. v. Iowa Department of
Revenue,46 however, the Court has indicated that taxes which dis-
criminate based solely on a corporation’s choice of domicile do not
per se violate the dormant commerce clause where the relevant facts
show that the foreign corporation conducts all of its business within
professor, who teaches at a law school located in New York City, the right to allocate any
of his wage income to his home in Connecticut where he performed some of his schol-
arly research and writing for his own personal convenience).
42. Id.
43. Oklahoma Tax Comm’n v. Jefferson Lines, Inc., 514 U.S. 175, 185 (1995).
44. Zelinsky, 1 N.Y.3d at 92.  Even where the commuter performs some of his work
at home for his own personal convenience, that does not transform the activity of com-
muting from one’s personal residence into an interstate business:
We note at the outset that many busy professionals, at the conclusion of a
full day, routinely bring work home to the evenings or weekends. Even when
undertaken by an out-of-state commuter such as petitioner, this work cannot trans-
form employment that takes place wholly within New York into an interstate business
activity subject to the Commerce Clause.
Id. (emphasis added).
45. See South Cent. Bell Tel. Co., v. Ala., 526 U.S. 160 (1999).
46. 505 U.S. 71 (1992).
\\server05\productn\N\NLR\49-3\NLR302.txt unknown Seq: 11 28-APR-05 7:49
2005] COMMUTER’S CHOICE OF WHERE TO RESIDE 953
the taxing jurisdiction.47  If, as the Court has indicated, a tax that
discriminates based upon a corporation’s choice of domicile — a
choice which, by definition, is a business decision — does not per se
discriminate against interstate commerce, it is considerably less
likely that a tax which discriminates based upon an individual’s
choice of personal residence violates the dormant commerce
clause.
The Court has evolved separate tests to determine whether a
state’s effort to tax or to regulate an interstate activity violates the
dormant commerce clause: (1) the so-called “Pike balancing test,”
which is applicable to determining whether a state regulation un-
duly burdens interstate commerce and (2) the four-part Complete
Auto test which is applicable to taxes.48  Each test asks essentially the
same questions — if the tax or regulation discriminates against in-
terstate commerce it usually falls without further inquiry, and if the
tax or regulatory burden placed on interstate commerce exceeds
the state’s interest in the activity such that it amounts to discrimina-
tion against interstate commerce, the tax or regulation is, likewise,
struck down.49 The Court has limited the applicability of either test,
however, to protecting interstate businesses from discriminatory
burdens,50 and has carefully refrained from using the dormant
47. Id. at 75-76.
Amicus United States notes that a subsidiary’s place of incorporation does
not necessarily correspond to the locus of its business operations.  A domes-
tic corporation might do business abroad, and its dividends might reflect
earnings from its foreign activity.  Conversely, a foreign corporation might
do business in the United States, with its dividends payments reflecting do-
mestic business operations . . . We recognize that the domicile of a corporation
does not necessarily establish that it is engaged in either foreign or domestic commerce.
In this case, however, it is stipulated that the foreign subsidiaries did, in
fact, operate in foreign commerce and, further, that the decision to do bus-
iness abroad through foreign subsidiaries is typically supported by legiti-
mate business reasons.
Id. (emphasis added).
48. Pike, 397 U.S. at 142; Complete Auto, 430 U.S. at 279.
49. Pike, 397 U.S. at 142; Complete Auto, 430 U.S. at 279. See also Armco, 467 U.S. at
644-45 (stating that “[a] tax that unfairly apportions income from other states,” and,
hence, exceeds the state’s interest in the income-generating activity, “is a form of dis-
crimination against interstate commerce.”).
50. Pike, 397 U.S. 137 (involving an Arizona regulation requiring locally produced
cantaloupes to be packaged in Arizona, ostensibly to ensure that the cantaloupes would
be identified as originating in Arizona.  The Court held that Arizona’s interest in identi-
fying its cantaloupes did not justify the discriminatory effect of the legislation requiring
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commerce clause as a vehicle for substituting its policy judgments
for that of Congress.
Under the “Pike balancing test,” a local regulation that impacts
interstate commerce withstands Commerce Clause scrutiny where
the local benefits to be derived from the putative local interest out-
weigh the burden placed on interstate commerce.51  The purpose
of this test is to guard against a state’s overreaching, the practical
effect of which is to benefit local economic interests by burdening
interstate competition, either by requiring business operations to
be performed in the home state,52 or by erecting a barrier to the
entry of out-of-state competitors to the local market.53 Where, how-
ever, the justification for the burden on interstate commerce is the
health and safety of a state’s citizens, the Court has ordinarily found
the requisite justification to uphold even regulations that impose a
heavy burden on the proscribed activity.54  Such a burden is justi-
fied by the state’s interest advanced by the regulation; a legitimate
exercise of its police powers, rather than a veiled attempt to give a
competitive advantage to the local citizenry.
Although the goals of the Pike balancing test are well-defined,
such a test, which weighs the benefits of local legislative policy and
the means available to accomplish that policy against the burden
placed on interstate commerce, is by its very nature subjective.  By
comparison, the Court has developed a more precise formula to
measure the state’s interest in a subject of interstate commerce for
purposes of taxation.
Under the Complete Auto test, a state tax will not violate the dor-
mant commerce clause where: (1) it is applied to an activity with a
substantial nexus to the taxing state, (2) it is fairly apportioned, (3)
it does not discriminate, and (4) it is fairly related to the services
provided by the state.55  The Commerce Clause concerns that are
central to, both, Pike and Complete Auto are whether the various
business operations (the packaging) to be performed in the home state.  In situations
where the balancing test applies, i.e., where the statute does not discriminate either on
its face or in practical effect, the standard of review is not strict but heightened scrutiny,
and legitimate health or safety regulations generally pass muster under this test).
51. Pike, 397 U.S. at 142.
52. See, e.g., id.
53. See, e.g., Lewis v. BT Inv. Managers, Inc., 447 U.S. 27, 35 (1980).
54. Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131 at 150; Pike, 397 U.S. at 142.
55. Complete Auto, 430 U.S. at 279.
\\server05\productn\N\NLR\49-3\NLR302.txt unknown Seq: 13 28-APR-05 7:49
2005] COMMUTER’S CHOICE OF WHERE TO RESIDE 955
states having the requisite jurisdiction over an interstate activity
(consistent with due process) will be able to exert the same or simi-
lar burdens on that activity, thus destroying interstate commerce
under the weight of multiple taxes or multiple regulatory restric-
tions.  A state’s reach under the Due Process Clause is extensive,
and, absent the Commerce Clause, a state could tax or regulate any
“purposeful” activity directed to its jurisdiction, even those having
no physical contact.56 The dormant commerce clause prevents mul-
tiple burdens of the kind that, if repeated by every state having ju-
risdiction over the activity, would destroy interstate commerce.57 In
essence, the dormant commerce clause limits the tax or regulatory
burden so as not to exceed the state’s interest in the activity being
taxed or regulated.  Unlike the policy-driven analysis and subjective
weighing under Pike, however, the state’s interest in taxing an inter-
state activity can be quantified.
A state’s quantifiable interest in interstate commerce is entirely
determined by the “protection, opportunities and benefits” it af-
fords the interstate activity.58  The degree of “protection, opportu-
nities and benefits” a state provides to an interstate activity, may, in
turn, be measured by the values derived from the activity within the
jurisdiction, taking the form of local market exploitation and the
use of local resources,59 such as the amount of the sales into the
jurisdiction, or the value of property or wages employed in the juris-
diction.60  For a state tax on an activity to, both, comport with the
fairness required by procedural due process, and limit the risk of
multiple burdens on interstate commerce, the activity must have
“some definite link, some minimum connection”61 or nexus to the
56. Quill v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 306–07 (1992).
57. See Western Live Stock v. Bureau of Revenue, 303 U.S. 250, 260 (1938)(“The
tax is not one which in form or substance can be repeated by other states in such a
manner so as to lay an added burden on the interstate distribution of the magazine.”).
58. Wisconsin v. J.C. Penney, 311 U.S. 435, 444-45 (1940).
59. See, e.g., Commonwealth Edison, 453 U.S. at 609; J.C. Penney, 311 U.S. at 446.
60. Container Corp. of Am. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. 159, 170 (1983); Moor-
man Mfg. v. Blair, 437 U.S. 267, 273 (1978).
61. Quill, 504 U.S. at 306 (citation omitted).
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jurisdiction,62 and the state may tax only as much of the interstate
activity as is rationally related to in-state values.63
Where a state’s interest in a taxed activity is measured in terms
of these in-state values, there is reasonable assurance that each state
having a substantial nexus to the interstate activity will reach only
that part of the activity attributable to values on its side of the state
line, and no more.  The values within each jurisdiction represent
the only part of the interstate activity in which each state has a sov-
ereign interest.  These values include the sales, labor and property
employed within the state, which result from the “protection, op-
portunities and benefits” provided by that state to the interstate ac-
tivity.  Where the tax is measured by these in-state values (and the
taxing scheme does not discriminate against interstate commerce),
the role of the dormant commerce clause in restricting state taxa-
tion of interstate commerce is at an end.
Therefore, regardless of whether the dormant commerce
clause is being applied to a tax or regulation of interstate com-
merce, the interstate labor markets being protected in cases like
Pike or Complete Auto relate to the business operations performed in
another state (out-of-state labor).  The dormant commerce clause,
thus, protects interstate business location decisions and interstate
business transactions. “That is, a State may not tax a transaction or
incident more heavily when it crosses state lines than when it occurs
entirely within the State.”64
Unlike the decision to choose one state over another to locate
business operations,65 the decision of where to reside is a personal
62. Note that Complete Auto refers to a “substantial nexus,” and those taxes impos-
ing a greater risk of multiple burdens, such as the gross receipts and sales/use taxes,
have been held to a higher nexus standard than is required by due process. Complete
Auto, 430 U.S. at 279. See, e.g., Nat’l Geographic Soc’y v. California, 430 U.S. 551, 557
(1977) (holding that a greater nexus is required for a gross receipts tax); Quill, 504 U.S.
at 304 (discussing that a greater nexus is required for sales/use tax).
63. Quill, 504 U.S. at 306.
64. Armco, Inc. v. Hardesty, 467 U.S. 638, 642 (1984).
65. A tax may not discriminate against taxpayers based upon where they locate
their business operations because, under the Commerce Clause, “the borders between
the States are essentially irrelevant . . . in matters of foreign and interstate commerce
there are no state lines.” Commonwealth Edison, 453 U.S. at 618 (citation omitted).  Note
that the dormant commerce clause does not protect the mere “location” of the busi-
ness, but rather “the products manufactured or the business operations performed”
there.  Westinghouse Electric v. Tully, 466 U.S. 388, 407 n.12 (1984).
\\server05\productn\N\NLR\49-3\NLR302.txt unknown Seq: 15 28-APR-05 7:49
2005] COMMUTER’S CHOICE OF WHERE TO RESIDE 957
one.  Personal commuting does not transform into the kind of in-
terstate labor protected by the dormant commerce clause simply
because an individual commutes to work by crossing the state line.
This proposition is a necessary corollary of the Complete Auto test.  A
commuter cannot generally assert that any part of his/her inter-
state activity can be properly apportioned to the state of residency,
because none of the value of his/her local employment is properly
attributable there.  Local employers, moreover, generally advertise
locally to fill job vacancies, and do not ordinarily undertake exten-
sive advertising for local employment opportunities in other
states.66  Therefore, the kind of interstate labor market protected
by the dormant commerce clause, namely, labor performed in
other states, is simply not placed at issue in commuting.  Congress,
however, clearly does have the authority to regulate commuting
under the positive Commerce Clause because its broad regulatory
authority extends to all subjects that impact interstate commerce,
even where no discrimination is present.67  The activity is not sub-
ject to the strict scrutiny of the dormant commerce clause where
Congress chooses not to act.  Rather, states must comport with the
lesser “substantial equality” standard of the Privileges and Immuni-
ties Clause when taxing or regulating such an activity, unless Con-
gress states otherwise.
II. REVISITING THE NEW YORK COURT OF APPEALS’ COMMUTER
TAX CASE – CITY OF NEW YORK V. STATE.
In the Commuter Tax Case,68 the New York Court of Appeals
ruled that New York City’s commuter tax, which discriminated on
its face against nonresidents of the state, violated, both, the Privi-
66. Contra  Camps Newfound, 520 U.S. at 573 (explaining “[t]he record reflects that
petitioner advertises for campers in [out-of-state] periodicals . . . and sends its Executive
Director annually on camper recruiting trips across the country.  Petitioner’s efforts are
quite successful; 95 percent of its campers come from out of State.”) (citation omitted).
67. See generally Wickard, 317 U.S. at 111; Heart of Atlanta, 379 U.S. at 241; Katzen-
bach, 379 U.S. at 294 (delineating Congress’ broad authority to regulate commerce).  As
is evident from cases such as Cooley and Pike, a state regulation can pass dormant com-
merce clause muster because it does not discriminate against interstate commerce or
exceed the local interest in the activity that is the subject of the tax or regulation. See
also supra text accompanying notes 46-52. Congress, nevertheless, can still opt to regu-
late that activity as a matter of policy.
68. City of New York, 94 N.Y.2d at 577.
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leges and Immunities Clause and the dormant commerce clause of
the United States Constitution.  The decision marked the first time
a commuter tax had been invalidated on dormant commerce clause
grounds.69
For over thirty years the city imposed a tax on nonresident
commuters who work in the city.70  In 1999 the New York Legisla-
ture enacted Chapter 5 of the Laws of 1999, which repealed the
city’s commuter tax as it applied to New York residents, but kept in
place the tax on out-of-state residents. Chapter 5 of the Laws of
1999 provided that if the repeal of the commuter tax on New York
residents was held to be invalid, the entire city’s commuter tax
would be repealed.  Residents of New Jersey and Connecticut com-
menced a facial attack on the constitutionality of Chapter 5 of the
Laws of 1999, arguing that the partial repeal as to New York re-
sidents discriminated against out-of-state commuters, and violated
the Privileges and Immunities Clause and the dormant commerce
clause.71  The New York Court of Appeals held Chapter 5 of the
Laws of 1999 invalid under, both, the Privileges and Immunities
Clause and dormant commerce clause, the effect of which was to
repeal New York City’s commuter tax in its entirety.72
The New York Court of Appeals based its decision on the
United State’s Supreme Court’s decision in Camps Newfound v. Town
of Harrison.73 Camps Newfound involved a challenge under the dor-
mant commerce clause to Maine’s real property tax-exemption
awarded to “benevolent and charitable institutions” incorporated in
Maine.74  The exemption was available, as a practical matter, only
69. Some of the early dormant commerce clause cases involved discrimination
against non-resident traveling salespersons (who were sometimes referred to as “drum-
mers”) but the discrimination in those cases was always aimed at interstate commerce
and not at the non-residency status. See, e.g., Robbins v. Shelby County, 120 U.S. 489,
491 (1887) (citation omitted) (invalidating a discriminatory tax directed against sales-
persons for out-of-state firms that did not maintain a regular place of business in the
state, i.e., “all persons not having a regular licensed house of business in the Taxing
District, offering for sale or selling goods, wares, or merchandise therein, by sample
. . .”); Welton v. Missouri, 91 U.S. 275 (1875) (invalidating a discriminatory tax against
salespersons who sold out-of-state goods).
70. City of New York, 94 N.Y.2d at 587.
71. Id. at 592.
72. Id. at 593.
73. 520 U.S. 564 (1997).
74. Id. at 568.
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where the charitable institution provided its services to Maine re-
sidents.75  The challenge was brought by a Maine nonprofit corpo-
ration that operated a summer camp for children of the Christian
Science faith.76  The camp had aggressively marketed its services
throughout the United States.77  It was ineligible for the exemption
because ninety-five percent of its campers were nonresidents of
Maine.78  The United States Supreme Court invalidated the exemp-
tion on the grounds that it “functionally serves as an export tariff
that targets out-of-state consumers by taxing the businesses that
principally serve them.”79
In relying on Camps Newfound as an alternate ground to invali-
date New York City’s commuter tax, the New York Court of Appeals
looked to the part of Camps Newfound which stated that “the move-
ment of persons across State lines is a form of commerce. In Camps,
the Court found that nonresident campers who crossed State lines
to attend a camp in Maine affect interstate commerce.”80  Based on
this reasoning, the New York Court of Appeals extended the dor-
mant commerce clause to the thousands of commuters who crossed
State lines to work in New York City.
The New York Court of Appeals, thus, appears to have read
Camps Newfound as having been based on the right of nonresident
commuters to travel across state lines, and that this right of inter-
state travel furnished the requisite “interstate commerce” to impli-
cate the dormant commerce clause in that case.  From a closer
reading of Camps Newfound, however, it does not appear that its in-
vocation of the dormant commerce clause was based solely on the
movement of the campers across state lines.
For the interstate movement of individuals to be, in all in-
stances, protected by the dormant commerce clause, the personal
75. Id. at 568-69.  Although the Maine statute nominally awarded a lesser real
property tax exemption of $50,000 to charitable institutions that provided their services
to nonresident consumers, an organization would be disqualified from that exemption
if the average weekly rate charged by the organization exceeded $30 per week. Id. at
569. The rate charged by the camp in this case was $400 per week, far in excess of that
amount. Id. at 567.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 573.
78. Id. at 581.
79. Id. at 580-81.
80. City of New York, 94 N.Y.2d at 597 (citations omitted).
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right of interstate travel must necessarily derive from the dormant
commerce clause.  The United States Supreme Court, however, has
repeatedly held to the contrary, both, before and after its 1997 deci-
sion in Camps Newfound.  In Bray v. Alexandria Women’s Health
Clinic,81 the Court had held “[t]hat right [the individual right of
interstate travel] does not derive from the negative Commerce
Clause, or else it could be eliminated by Congress.”  Instead, the
Court concluded that the right derives from the Privileges and Im-
munities Clause of Article IV.82  Similarly, in Saenz v. Roe83, the
Court thoroughly considered the origin of the individual right of
interstate travel, again concluding that it derived exclusively from
the Privileges and Immunities Clause.  The Court, therefore, would
not have invoked the dormant commerce clause in Camps Newfound
solely because there was a movement of the campers across state
lines, as that would have directly contradicted its “individual right
of interstate travel” cases.84
Any such holding would also have been a novel extension of its
dormant commerce clause jurisprudence.  In an unbroken line of
cases dating back to its dormant commerce clause dicta in Gibbons v.
Ogden,85 the Court has never wavered from the role it assigned to
that Clause: to protect the right to locate business operations any-
where in the United States, without regard to which side of the state
line those operations are to be performed.  Had Camps Newfound
been grounded solely on the interstate movement of the campers,
its holding would have represented an unprecedented extension of
the dormant commerce clause to protecting the personal decision
of where to reside.  Again, the Court has not, to date, interpreted
the dormant commerce clause as protecting personal decisions.
Strictly personal decisions could never give rise to an interstate ap-
portionment under Complete Auto because none of the labor activity
could be apportioned to the personal residence, and, therefore,
81. 506 U.S. 263, 277 n.7 (1993).
82. Id. at 276-77.
83. 526 U.S. 489, 501-02 (1999).
84. The cases cited in Camps Newfound, such as Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160,
172 (1941), do not address the individual right to travel, but rather the enterprise of
transporting persons across state lines. Camps Newfound, 520 U.S. at 573.
85. See, e.g., Gibbons, 22 U.S. at 193; Southern Pacific, 325 U.S. at 761.
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those personal decisions are not the kind of interstate commerce
the Court thought to be protected where Congress is silent.86
While Camps Newfound may have been novel in its treatment of
charities as profit-making enterprises,87 if the entities involved had
been profit-making enterprises, the decision would have followed
from two other Court decisions: Tyler Pipe Industries, Inc. v. Washing-
ton88 and West Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy.89 Camps Newfound held a
property tax-exemption discriminating against the sale of services
by a camp to nonresident consumers an “export tariff.”90  It, thus,
followed from Tyler and West Lynn Creamery because the discrimina-
tory burden was placed at the retail level on the sale to the con-
sumer.  Thus, the movement of campers across state lines was
merely part and parcel with the Court’s finding that the consumers
were solicited from other states which, therefore, resulted in inter-
state commerce.  Simply put, the camp exploited markets in other
jurisdictions; interstate commerce in the traditional sense, albeit in
services rather than goods.
Camps Newfound, therefore, does not support an extension of
the dormant commerce clause to personal commuting.  Such a
holding would have been contrary to more than 150 years of dor-
mant commerce clause jurisprudence, which is best summarized as
follows: “[A] State may not tax a transaction or incident more heav-
ily when it crosses State lines than when it occurs entirely within the
State.”91
The foregoing shows that the restrictions imposed on states by
the negative or dormant commerce clause is necessarily narrower in
its scope than Congress’s power to act under the positive Com-
merce Clause.  The dormant commerce clause is delineated by the,
86. The Court’s dormant commerce clause decisions have protected against state
regulations or taxes that force certain interstate activities to be performed in the home
state. See, e.g., New Energy Company v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269 (1988) (tax credit penal-
ized gasohol production in other states); See also Armco,  467 U.S. at 638 (tax credit
penalized manufacturing in other states).
87. Camps Newfound, 520 U.S. at 595 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
88. 483 U.S. 232 (1987) (holding that discrimination against exports violates the
dormant commerce clause).
89. 512 U.S. 186 (1994) (imposing a discriminatory burden at any point in the
stream of commerce violates dormant commerce clause).
90. Camps Newfound, 520 U.S. at 580-581.
91. Id. at 581.
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quite specific, Complete Auto tests designed to protect interstate busi-
ness.  It does not protect against every potential burden on the na-
tional economy, only those tariff-like burdens which have a
discriminatory effect on interstate markets.92  Other potential bur-
dens on the national economy are best handled by Congressional
legislation.  Moreover, since the dormant commerce clause is im-
plied, it cannot override an entire subject area governed by an ex-
press Constitutional provision.
The foregoing notwithstanding, Camps Newfound appears to
state the opposite conclusion:  “The definition of ‘commerce’ is the
same when relied on to strike down or restrict state legislation as
when relied on to support some exertion of federal control or regu-
lation.”93  The quote, however, should not be removed from its con-
text.  The Court meant it as a loophole closer, elevating substance
over form.  Although the property tax in that case was levied on
something strictly local (i.e. the camp’s property wholly situated in
Maine), the Court held that the broad definition of “commerce”
would, nevertheless, encompass the property tax because of its ef-
fect on interstate commerce.  Both, the positive and negative as-
pects of the Commerce Clause extend not merely to “commerce” as
such, but also to activities which, in Congress’s judgment, exert a
substantial effect on interstate commerce.94
If, as this article has sought to show, the scope of the dormant
commerce clause is limited to protecting interstate business, then
the point at which an activity is deemed to be a necessary incident
of a business, rather than a personal activity, becomes meaningful.
Commuting is distinguished from business travel, in that, with re-
spect to the latter, the points of origination and termination are all
business related (i.e., from the office to a client, to the factory, to a
warehouse, etc.).
The Court has addressed this distinction in a related context,
specifically, when travel is deemed to be “in pursuit of a trade or
business,” instead of personal commuting, for federal income tax
purposes.  In Commissioner v. Flowers,95 the Court ruled that an attor-
92. See, e.g., Tracy, 519 U.S. at 300.
93. Camps Newfound, 520 U.S. at 574.
94. See Wickard, 317 U.S. at 111; Heart of Atlanta, 379 U.S. at 241; Katzenbach, 379
U.S. at 294.
95. 326 U.S. 465 (1946).
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ney employed by a railroad incurred travel expenses “in pursuit of
business . . . only when the railroad’s business forced the taxpayer
to travel . . . The exigencies of the business rather than the personal
conveniences and necessities of the traveler must be the motivating
factors.”96
In Flowers, the Court distinguished business from personal
travel for purposes of the federal income tax, not the Commerce
Clause.97 The early “drummers” cases,98 nevertheless, make clear
that the dormant commerce clause protects employees who travel
at the behest of their employer to states where the employer main-
tains no place of business.99  More generally, those cases also hold
that a discriminatory tax levied on “business” travel dictated by busi-
ness exigencies, as described in Flowers, violates the dormant com-
merce clause when it is applied to employees who travel for an out-
of-state business.100  The rationale of the “drummers” cases would
not, however, extend dormant commerce clause protection to
travel that is for the employee’s own personal convenience,101 such
as commuting to work from home.  Each of those cases were con-
cerned with protecting an employer’s choice of where to locate its
business, not an employee’s choice of where to reside.
III. TELECOMMUTING DOES NOT IMPLICATE THE DORMANT
COMMERCE CLAUSE — MATTER OF ZELINSKY
In Matter of Zelinsky v. Tax Appeals Tribunal of the State of New
York,102 the New York Court of Appeals held that where an individ-
ual works from home for his own personal convenience and, thus,
telecommutes to work, that activity does not implicate the dormant
commerce clause.  The case was brought by Edward Zelinsky, a law
professor who taught in New York City at Cardozo Law School.  Pro-
fessor Zelinsky performed some of the scholarly work in connection
96. Id. at 474 (emphasis added).
97. Id. (interpreting the predecessor to Internal Revenue Code §162(a)(2) which
allows as an “ordinary and necessary” trade or business deduction “traveling expenses
. . . [incurred] while away from home in pursuit of a trade or business.”).
98. See Robbins v. Shelby County, 120 U.S. 489, 491 (1887).
99. See Welton v. Missouri, 91 U.S. 275, 282 (1875).
100. Id.
101. See Flowers, 326 U.S. at 474.
102. 1 N.Y.3d 85 (2003).
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with his teaching activities at his Connecticut home for his own per-
sonal convenience.  Professor Zelinsky argued that he should be en-
titled to allocate some of his law school salary to his Connecticut
home free from the New York State personal income tax on nonres-
ident individuals, based on the time he spent performing some of
his work.
Under the “convenience of the employer rule,” however, New
York will not allow a nonresident to allocate income outside the
jurisdiction where such work is performed at the employee’s per-
sonal convenience, and will only allow the employee to allocate
where the work is performed at home for the employer’s conve-
nience.  In upholding the convenience of the employer rule under
the facts of this case, the New York Court of Appeals found that the
work that Professor Zelinsky chose to do at home was “inextricably
intertwined with the business of his New York law school. He can-
not convert his employer’s New York business into an interstate one
when Cardozo did not employ him to carry out any of the school’s
business activities in Connecticut.”103
Although Professor Zelinsky had challenged the convenience
of the employer rule under the “fair apportionment” prong of Com-
plete Auto,104 the New York Court of Appeals ruled that Professor
Zelinsky’s bringing work home for his own personal convenience
does not implicate the dormant commerce clause.  As the City of
New York had argued in its amicus brief, the Zelinsky Court stated
that:
Allowing this taxpayer to allocate his income to Connecti-
cut when he stays home to do his work in connection with
his teaching activity would enable him to avoid paying
taxes that his colleagues who do that work at home — or
at the law school — pay.  The Constitution does not re-
quire that a nonresident who does not opt for the per-
sonal convenience of taking work home rather than
traveling into work every day be taxed at a higher effective
tax rate than one who does.  The State need not subsidize
such personal convenience, while at the same time dis-
103. Id. at 92.
104. See supra text accompanying note 55.
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couraging commuting into New York City and facilitating
erosion of the tax base.105
Although the Court’s ruling was limited to the facts of this
case, its reasoning would apply to all telecommuting undertaken at
the employee’s personal convenience.106  If the decision of whether
or not to work from home for the employee’s personal convenience
is not subject to apportionment (because no business is performed
at home) and for that same reason, does not implicate the dormant
commerce clause, then personal commuting cannot constitute the
kind of interstate trade protected by the dormant commerce clause
under the U.S. Supreme Court’s dormant commerce clause
jurisprudence.
IV. CONCLUSION
The dormant commerce clause protects interstate markets and
transactions from state taxes and regulations that discriminate or
overreach.  Although Congress can regulate commuting under its
affirmative Commerce Clause authority, the dormant commerce
clause has never been interpreted as being implicated by state clas-
sifications that result in differential treatment based upon the
choice of a personal residence.  Any such differential treatment is,
therefore, not invalid per se, as generally would be the case under
the Commerce Clause, but is subject to heightened scrutiny under
the “substantial equality” standard mandated by the Privileges and
Immunities Clause.
A contrary interpretation would not only be without any prece-
dent in the more than 150 years of dormant commerce clause juris-
prudence, but would effectively nullify the Privileges and
Immunities Clause by subjecting state classifications that distinguish
based on residency to the strict scrutiny of the Commerce Clause.
105. Zelinsky, 1 N.Y.3d at 94.
106. See Matter of Huckaby v. New York State Division of Tax Appeals, 6 A.D.3d 988
(3d Dep’t 2004) (upholding a challenge to New York’s “convenience of the employer”
rule under the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses as applied to a Tennessee
resident employed as a computer programmer for a New York employer.  The em-
ployee worked from his Tennessee home and, on occasion, traveled into New York to
work at his employer’s office.  The Appellate Division, under the reasoning in Zelinsky,
held that due process does not prohibit New York from apportioning 100% of the em-
ployee’s salary, and, likewise, rejected petitioner’s equal protection challenge).
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The Constitution defines a balance of power as between and among
the states and the federal government that has long been construed
as tolerating no state discrimination against the free flow of trade,
but that also recognizes the possibility of circumstances under
which the residents of other states may not be entitled to be treated
identically as local residents, where there is a “substantial justifica-
tion” for the difference in treatment.  The dormant commerce
clause, implied by the Court to prevent states from overreaching
into Congress’ domain, should not be construed so as to override
an express provision in the Constitution.
